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Abstract. This paper analyses an evolutionary version of the Pub-
lic Good game of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) in which agents can
choose between imitation and best-reply decision rules. We describe condi-
tions under which altruistic and rational (maximizing) behavior arise: these
conditions are established for any number of neighbors and any total number
of agents in the population. Given mistake-free play, (short-run) outcomes are
identical whether agents are constrained to employ an imitation rule only; or
they can choose between imitation and best-reply rules. Given the possibility of
mistakes, (long-run) outcomes vary across these two scenarios. The paper sug-
gests how to provide public goods and gives an explanation of why we observe
seemingly irrational cooperation - altruistic behavior - in the rational world.
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”...individualﬁrms behave as if they were seeking rationally to maxi-
mize their expected returns...”
Milton Friedman (1953, page 21.)
”. .. success (survival) accompanies relative superiority...”
Armen A. Alchian (1950, page 213.)
1. Introduction
The preceding characterizations of ﬁrm behavior reﬂect a consensus view among
economists. Yet examples of seemingly contradictory behavior abound. This paper
oﬀers a potential evolutionary explanation how altruistic behavior can arise in the
rational world.
It is well understood in the evolutionary literature that altruistic behavior can
prevail in an evolutionary environment if all agents are imitators and their interactions
are local. See Bergstrom and Stark (1993); Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998);
and Bergstrom (2002).
The present paper also uses the local interaction structure: an evolutionary version
of the Public Good game of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998), but my agents
select a rule (either imitation or best-reply) in every period, and then use this rule to
c h o o s eas t r a t e g y .T h es e l e c t e dr u l ec a nb et h es a m ed e c i s i o nr u l eo rm a yv a r ya c r o s s
agents and periods. I demonstrate that altruistic behavior has hope in this world.
The Public Good game is considered for several reasons. First, it is simple: every
player has just two strategies in the Public Good game. Second, one strategy strictly
dominates the other and corresponds to spiteful and rational behavior. In otherAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 3
words, Armen Alchian and Milton Friedman will agree on this strategy. The other
strategy is strictly dominated and corresponds to altruistic behavior.
Third, the imitation rule is hardly the only decision rule that can be used by
experienced economic agents. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that ﬁrms use
rational rules. There are many rational rules.1 But without loss of generality we can
restrict our analysis only to the one of such rules - the best-reply rule, because any
rational decision rule selects the dominant strategy in the Public Good game.
Finally, there is a possible conﬂict between imitation and best-reply decision rules:
On the one hand Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) show that the imitation rule
can lead to altruistic behavior in the Public Good game, even in the presence of
mutations that continually introduce the rational strategy into the model. On the
other hand, Young (1998) demonstrates that the best-reply rule leads to rational
behavior.
In my model, the agents select the best-performing decision rule from the previous
period. In order to make the exposition simple, I assume that an agent uses the
previous-period decision rule, if this rule selected the strategy with the highest payoﬀ
in her neighborhood in the previous period, and switches to the other rule otherwise.
My assumption that agents can use severald e c i s i o nr u l e si ss u p p o r t e di ne x p e r i -
ments. The literature on experimental economics claims that there is no single rule
that can describe human behavior (see Mookherjee and Sopher, 1994, 1997; Cheung
and Friedman, 1997; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 1999;
Salmon, 2001).
In reality, from time to time humans experiment with many diﬀerent decision rules.
(See Arthur, 1994, for an excellent discussion. He also cites psychology literature.)
Arthur (1994) models agents with several predictions or hypotheses in the form of
1See, for example, Stahl (1993), Saez-Marti and Weibull (1999) and Matros (2003).Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 4
functions that map previous outcomes into next-period outcomes. However, he oﬀers
only computer simulation for a particular “Bar Problem”.
My main result is that altruistic behavior can arise in both the short run (mistake-
free play) and in the long run (in the presence of mistakes and errors), if the neighbor-
hoods are not too small.2 It is in sharp contrast to Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked’s
(1998) claim that
This [imitation] is crucial, as altruism has no hope in a world of best
responders.3
This paper shows that this claim is not precise. Moreover, if altruistic behavior
survives in the short and long run, agents demonstrate altruistic behavior in groups:
agents obtain high payoﬀs from altruistic behavior of neighbors in such groups and
do not switch (imitation) decision rule and therefore do not change behavior.
I demonstrate that one of the two decision rules, the imitation rule, fully character-
izes short-run outcomes. It means that even though a set of decision rules can better
represent human behavior, the actual short-run prediction of the model (mistake-free
play) can coincide with a simpler model where each agent has just one decision rule.
Even though the imitation rule is enough to characterize agents’ short-run behav-
ior, Theorem 2 shows that both decision rules are important in determining long-run
outcomes. Some agents can occasionally switch decision rules and/or their behavior
in the long run. Again, if altruistic behavior survives, it survives in groups. This
result gives an idea how to provide public goods: the provision should be organized
in relatively small groups.
2In the two - neighbor case only spiteful maximizing behavior remains in the population, given
the possibility of mistakes.
3Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998), page 158.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 5
Theorem 2 describes long-run outcomes, if the probabilities of agents’ mistake
in the selection of decision rules (μ → 0) and error in choosing a strategy (ε → 0)
tend to zero. If it is easier to make a mistake in the selection of the decision rule
than to make an error in choosing a strategy to play, occasionally spiteful behavior
will prevail and consequently be the only possible behavior in the long run (if ε → 0
faster than μ → 0). However, if it is easier to make an error in choosing a strategy to
play than to make a mistake in the selection of the decision rule (μ → 0f a s t e rt h a n
ε → 0), then altruistic behavior can survive in groups, because the gain to stay in
altruistic groups is higher than the gain from staying in spiteful groups. Theorem 2
describes completely long-run outcomes for diﬀerent speed of convergence of μ and ε
to zero.
The work related to mine also includes papers on the market selection hypothe-
sis, which claims that market forces weed out less proﬁtable ﬁrms in favor of more
proﬁtable ﬁrms. There is a growing literature on market survival, which started with
Winter (1964), followed by Winter (1971), Nelson and Winter (1982), and recently
taken up by Blume and Easley (1992, 1995, 2002), Radner (1996), Vega-Redondo
(1997), Dutta and Radner (1999), Dutta and Sundaram (2001). These papers check
the hypothesis and demonstrate that ﬁrms’ decision rules, which maximize long-run
survival probabilities, are not those which maximize expected proﬁts. This is the
same kind of result as we have in Theorem 2.
Finally, the best-reply and imitation rules are typical rules in evolutionary mod-
els. The best-reply rule usually leads to a rational outcome (see Young, 1993, 1998;
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Ellison, 1993; Blume, 1993; Samuelson, 1997).
Bergstrom and Stark (1993); Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) show that the
imitation rule can lead to altruistic behavior. Simulation evidence for imitation be-
havior can be found in Nowak and May (1992, 1993) and Nowak, Bonhoeﬀer, andAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 6
May (1994).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 analyses the short-run prediction of the model. Section 4 examines the
long-run prediction of the model, if the agents can make mistakes and errors. Section
5 concludes. Proofs are given in the Appendix.
2. The Model: Public Good Game
We will call the following game the Public Good game. There are N players. A
player can either produce public goods which give one unit of utility to 2k<N
of her neighbors and incurs a net cost of 0 <c<1 to the player herself, or do
nothing at no cost. In other words, every player has two strategies: be Altruistic
with neighbors and produce public goods, or be Rational and not produce public
goods. We will call these strategies A and R respectively. Then the payoﬀ of an
agent i is πi = K(A,i) − c,i fa g e n ti plays strategy A,a n dπi = K(A,i), if agent
i plays strategy R,w h e r eK(A,i) ∈ {0,...,2k} is the number of i’s neighbors who
play strategy A.
The one-shot Public Good game has one strict Nash equilibrium (R,...,R), where
all players play strategy R. Moreover, strategy A is strictly dominated by strategy
R. If the Public Good game is played repeatedly, the Folk Theorem can be applied
and the play (A,...,A), where each player plays strategy A, can be sustained as an
equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated Public Good game.4
We will consider the following evolutionary version of the Public Good game. In
each discrete time period, t =1 ,2,..., ap o p u l a t i o no fN boundedly rational agents
plays the Public Good game.5 We assume, as in Ellison (1993); Bergstrom and Stark
4For discussion and applications of Folk Theorem see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
5Boundedly rational agents follow some (simple) decision rules. There might be several reasons
for that. For example, agents might lack enough abilities, or they simply do not have time to thinkAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 7
(1993); and Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998), that the agents are located on a
circle. An agent i chooses a strategy xt
i ∈ {A,R} at time t according to a decision
rule deﬁned below. The play at time t is the vector xt =( xt
1,...,x t
N).
Strategies are chosen as follows. We assume that every agent has two decision
rules. They are Best Reply (BR) and Imitation (IM). The BR rule can be described
as follows. An agent believes that her neighbor agents will play the same strategies
in period t + 1 as they did in the previous period t. Therefore, she plays a strategy





i+k) from the previous period t. Note that since strategy R
is the dominant strategy, the BR rule always chooses strategy R.T h eIM rule works
as follows. An agent plays a strategy in period t + 1, which gave the highest payoﬀ
among her 2k neighbors and her in the previous period t.
Now we explain how agents select decision rules. Suppose that an agent i used a
decision rule Dt ∈ {BR,IM} and played a strategy ∈ {A,R} in period t.D e ﬁne the
set of neighbors of player i as
Ji ≡ {i − k,...,i + k}.
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about the situation.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 8




























i (xt), the agent i uses the decision rule Dt in period t + 1 again,
otherwise she switches to the decision rule Dt+1 6= Dt in period t +1 . T h e r ei s
exactly one strategy in every sample which gives the highest payoﬀ, because of our
assumption 0 <c<1. An interpretation of such a rule selection is the following. If
an agent’s current strategy did not attain the maximum payoﬀ in the neighborhood,
whatever decision rule led to that choice does not seem to work well, so the agent
switches her decision rule.
Note that the agents do not observe the decision rules of other agents, just their
strategies. The assumption which rule to use in the current period is important and
we will look at the following examples to see how agents can change the imitation rule
into the best-reply rule and vice versa. We will call an agent whose previous period
decision rule is BR, a maximizer, and an agent whose previous period decision rule
is IM,a nimitator. We will say that an agent behaves altruistically if her previous
period strategy is A,a n drationally if her previous period strategy is R.6 Therefore
we can have rational maximizers and imitators and altruistic imitators in the model.
























i+2)=( 3− c,4,3 − c,3 − c,4 − c),
6Note that in the model both spiteful behavior and optimizing behavior correspond to the same
strategy S. We will call such behavior spiteful.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 9
where A is her own strategy choice. Only one agent plays strategy R in the sample








∗(R)=4> 4 − c = π
∗(A)
and the imitator will become the maximizer in the next period.























i+2)=( 3− c,2 − c,2,1,0),
where two of her neighbors play strategy R, the other two play strategy R and R is










the maximizer will become the imitator in the next period.
Assume that the sampling process begins in the period t = 1 from some arbitrary
initial play x0 and some arbitrary initial decision rule distribution d0.T h e nw eo b t a i n
a ﬁn i t eM a r k o vc h a i no nt h eﬁnite state space ({A,R})N × ({BR,IM})N of states
of the length 2N drawn from the strategy space {A,R} and the decision rule space
{BR,IM} with an arbitrary initial play x0 and some arbitrary initial decision rule
distribution d0. Given a play xt and a decision rule distribution dt at time t,t h e
process moves to a state of the form {xt+1;dt+1} in the next period. Such a state is
called a successor of {xt;dt}. We will call this process unperturbed adjusted dynamic
with population size N and 2k neighbors, ADN,k,0,0.
Example 2. Suppose that k =1 ,N =4 ,x0 =( A,A,R,R)a n dd0 =( IM,IM,BR,BR).Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 10
In period 1, each agent i inspects a sample (x0
i−1,x 0
i,x 0
i+1)o fs i z e3o fh e r2n e a r e s t
neighbors and her, taken from the previous play in period 0. Agents 3 and 4 (1 and
2) use the BR (IM) rule to choose a strategy at the beginning of period 0. Agents
3a n d4w i l lu s et h eBR rule again in period 1, because these agents observe that
strategy R gives a payoﬀ of 1 and strategy A gives a payoﬀ of 1 −c (there is exactly
one spiteful maximizer neighbor and one altruistic imitator neighbor for every agent).








∗(R)=1> 1 − c = π
∗(A), for any i.
It means that agents 1 and 2 will switch to the best-reply rule, BR, because they
also observe that strategy R gives the highest payoﬀ in their samples. Therefore
d1 =( BR,BR,BR,BR). Hence, all agents will use the BR rule in period 1 and play
the dominant strategy R, x1 =( R,R,R,R). As a result the unperturbed adjusted
dynamic process moves to the state {x1;d1} in period 1.
The unperturbed adjusted dynamic process describes short-run behavior in the
model when there are no mistakes and errors in the agents’ behavior. Short-run
predictions are useful, because the predicted outcome(s) arise very fast, due to the
local interaction structure of the model, stay long (until a mistake or an error is
made), and depend on the initial state.
Let us introduce some noise into the model. To model the situation in which a
r u l ec a nb ec h o s e nb yamistake, we suppose that the agents use the selected rule with
probability 1−μ and use the other rule at random with probability μ ≥ 0. Moreover,
suppose that agents use a decision rule to choose a strategy with probability 1 − ε
and make an error and choose a strategy at random with probability ε ≥ 0. The
resulting perturbed adjusted dynamic process ADN,k,μ,ε is an ergodic Markov process
on the ﬁnite state space ({A,R})N ×({BR,IM})N. Thus, in the long run, the initialAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 11
state is irrelevant.
3. Short Run: Recurrent Classes
In the rest of the paper, we will make use of the following deﬁnitions. A recurrent class
of the process ADN,k,0,0 is a set of states where there is a probability zero of moving
from any state in the set to any state outside and there is a positive probability of
moving from any state in the set to any other state in the set. We will call a state h
absorbing if it constitutes a singleton recurrent class. In this section we analyze the
s i t u a t i o nw h e na l la g e n t salways use the selected rule, μ = 0, and do not make errors,
ε =0 .
3.1. μ =0and ε =0 . Note that if every agent uses the imitation rule and
plays strategy A, then every agent obtains the same payoﬀ and therefore selects
the imitation rule again in the next period. Moreover, as everyone plays the same
strategy, the imitator chooses strategy A in the next period as well. It means that a
state of the form:
{(A,...,A);(IM,...,IM)} = {A;IM}
is absorbing.
Suppose that all agents played strategy R in the previous period. Either an agent
used the IM or the BR rule, she observes only strategy R in her sample. It means
that she will select her previous period decision rule in the next period too. Both the
imitator and the maximizer will again choose strategy R in the next period. Hence,
states in the form:
{(R,...,R);(d1,...,d N)} (1)
are absorbing, where dj can be either BR or IM, j ∈ {1,...,N}. Let a set {(R;·)}
denote all 2N states of the form (1).
The following examples show that there are other recurrent classes.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 12
Example 3. Suppose that N =7a n dk =2 .
There are ﬁve imitators who play strategy A and two maximizers who play strat-
egy R. It is evident that every agent ﬁnds that her strategy performs best in her
sample. For example, every imitator has the best imitator, marked IM,i nt h es a m -
ple. The best imitator receives 4−c which is the highest payoﬀ among all agents. It




and she selects the imitation rule in the next period.
Both maximizers do not have the best imitator in their neighborhoods which
means that their payoﬀs are the highest in their samples:
π
∗(R)=3> 3 − c = π
∗(A).
Therefore, both maximizers select the best-reply rule in the next period. It means that
every agent selects her previous period decision rule again. Hence, all agents choose
the previous period strategies again. Figure 1 gives an example of this recurrent class.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 13
The following example shows that a recurrent class can contain several states.
Example 4. There are eight imitators playing strategy A and one maximizer
playing strategy R,i nt h eﬁrst circle in Figure 2.
The maximizer obtains payoﬀ 4 which is the highest payoﬀ among all agents. There-
f o r e ,a l lh e rf o u rn e i g h b o r sﬁnd that
π
∗(R)=4> 4 − c = π
∗(A).
These four agents will change their decision rule from the imitation rule to the best-
reply rule in the next period. All maximizers choose strategy R in the next period,
as it is shown in the second circle in Figure 2. There are ﬁve maximizers and four




and select the imitation rule in next period which leads to the continuation of play-
ing strategy A. Two maximizers on the boundary between the maximizers and the
imitators are in the situation from example 1. They observe that two neighbors playAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 14
strategy A and the other two play strategy R.T h e h i g h e s t p a y o ﬀ to strategy A is





Therefore, these two maximizers change their decision rule from the best-reply to the
imitation rule in the next period. We observe this in the third circle in Figure 2.
There are three maximizers and six imitators in the third circle. Once again,
all imitators select the imitation rule and play strategy A in the next period. Two
maximizers on the boundary between the maximizers and the imitators are in the
situation from example 1. Therefore, these two maximizers change their decision rule
from the best-reply to the imitation rule in the next period. It explains how the
process moves from the third to the ﬁrst circle in Figure 2. The cycle repeats again.
Hence, Figure 2 gives an example of a recurrent class which contains three states.
Taking these examples into consideration, we can provide a complete description
of recurrent classes, if k ≥ 2. The following are recurrent classes:
• The state where all agents are imitators playing strategy P.
• The states where all agents play strategy R.T h es e t{(R;·)} contains all the
states of this kind.
• The state where all agents are imitators playing strategy A except for the two
adjacent imitators or maximizers playing strategy R:
...A,...,A,R,R,A,...A,...
• The set of three states, consisting of:
...A,...A,R,A,...A,...Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 15
...A,...A,R,...,R,A,...A,...
...A,...,A,R,R,R,A,...A,...,
where there is one agent playing strategy R in period t;2 k +1a g e n t sp l a y i n g
strategy R in period t+1; three agents playing strategy R in period t+2. This
cycle is repeated after that.
These examples and combinations based on them include all the possible recurrent
classes. Both strategies must appear in clusters in all recurrent classes.
Theorem 1. Suppose that k ≥ 2 and N ≥ k +4 . The recurrent classes of the
unperturbed process ADN,k,0,0 are
(i) the states where all agents play strategy R;
(ii) the state where all agents are imitators playing strategy A;
(iii) the state where a cluster of imitators consisting of k +2agents or more
playing strategy A is separated by a cluster of imitators or maximizers consisting of
two agents playing strategy R;
(iv) the sets of three states: in each of these states a cluster of imitators consisting
of k +2agents or more playing strategy A is separated by a cluster of imitators or
maximizers consisting of 2k +1 , 3 or 1 agents playing strategy R. If the cluster
consists of 2k +1(3 or 1) agents playing strategy R in one of the states, the state
moves to the state where the cluster consists of 3 (1 or 2k+1) agents playing strategy
R in the next period;
(v) combinations of (iii) and (iv).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 1 indicates that there are many recurrent classes in general. In all
but one of these recurrent classes, the majority of the population shows altruisticAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 16
behavior. Moreover, Theorem 1 not only describes short-run behavior of the agents,
but also emphasizes that such behavior can be described by the imitation decision
rule alone. This result might explain why we could consider one decision rule in
evolutionary models, even though people can use several decision rules. However,
Theorem 1 proves this result only for the Public Good game.7 Since the imitation
rule characterizes completely short-run outcomes for any size of the population, N,
and the neighborhoods, k, Theorem 1 generalizes the short-run results from Eshel,
Samuelson and Shaked (1998).8 It indicates all recurrent classes in general (even if
the agents use only the imitation decision rule). To see what lies behind the result, it
is helpful to remember that the imitation rule determines short-run outcomes. Even
though agents use two decision rules, once a cluster of k+2 or more altruistic imitators
is formed, every agent in this cluster ﬁnds that altruistic behavior leads to the highest
payoﬀ in the neighborhood and therefore does not change her decision rule which, in
turn, selects altruistic behavior. However, a cluster of spiteful maximizers can never
contain more than 2k + 1 agents (the only exception is when all agents are spiteful
maximizers) in the recurrent class. If there are more than 2k +1a g e n t si ns u c ha
cluster, then the two agents at its edges will each have k altruistic imitators on one
side and k spiteful maximizers on the other. In this situation the highest payoﬀ in
the neighborhood will correspond to the altruistic behavior which means that these
two agents change their decision rule and also become altruistic imitators.
3.2. Fixed μ, 0 < μ < 1. This subsection clariﬁes the main diﬀerence between
the approach of this paper and the approach of other evolutionary papers in the ﬁeld.
Typically authors model multiple decision rules in the following way: there are N
7An open question is whether one decision rule can always describe the short-run behavior of
agents who use several decision rules.
8Our case k = 2 corresponds to their main case.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 17
populations corresponding to N player positions in the game. Agents are chosen at
random from populations (one agent per population) to play the corresponding player
p o s i t i o n si nt h eg a m ei ne v e r yp e r i o d .E a c hp o p u l a t i o nc o n s i s t so fa g e n t so fd i ﬀerent
t y p e s :a g e n t so ft h es a m et y p ea l w a y su s et h es a m ed e c i s i o nr u l e( s e eS a e z - M a r t ia n d
Weibull, 1999; Matros, 2003).
If 0 < μ < 1a n dﬁxed, the agents can use both the best-reply and the imitation
rules with a positive probability in every period. Another interpretation of this situ-
ation is that there is a population of agents for every player position with at least μ
share of agents using the best-reply and the imitation rules.
If agents can use both decision rules with a positive probability in every period,
only spiteful behavior will survive in the short run. The intuition is simple: if occa-
sionally all agents use the best-reply rule in one period (this can happen with positive
probability), only strategy R will be present thereafter. The following proposition is
a corollary of Matros (Theorem 1, 2004).
Proposition 1. If μ is ﬁxed and such that 0 < μ < 1, only states from the set
{(R;·)} are absorbing states of the unperturbed process ADN,k,μ,0.
This ﬁnishes the description of short-run outcomes.
4. Long Run: Selection among Recurrent Classes
We now ask if altruistic behavior survives in the presence of agents’ mistakes or/and
errors. To answer this question, long-run behavior of the adjusted dynamic process
ADN,k,μ,ε will be analyzed in this section. First, we analyze the situation where μ is
positive and ﬁxed (the agents can always use both decision rules) and the probabilities
of errors tend to zero, ε → 0. Then, we consider the situation where both mistakes
and errors tend to zero, μ → 0, ε → 0.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 18
4.1. Fixed μ, 0 < μ < 1. From Proposition 1 and Theorem 3 in the Appendix, we
conclude that all agents must play strategy R in the long run, because all agents play
strategy R in every absorbing state. This result is consistent with Matros (Theorem
2, 2004). In other words, only spiteful behavior will be present in the population
when each decision rule can be chosen in every period.
Proposition 2. If μ is ﬁxed and such that 0 < μ < 1, the limiting distribution of the
adjusted dynamic process ADN,k,μ,ε puts a positive probability only on states from
the set {(R;·)}, where all agents play strategy R.
Proposition 2 not only describes long-run behavior of the agents, but also empha-
sizes that such behavior can be described by just one decision rule, if the agents can
use any decision rule in every period. This result holds in general, see Matros (2004).
In the next subsection we ﬁnd the long-run outcomes, if both mistakes and errors
tend to zero, μ → 0, ε → 0.
4.2. μ → 0, ε → 0. Now we consider how agents’ behavior changes in the presence
of mistakes and errors. For this purpose we study the agents’ long-run behavior when
the probabilities of mistakes and errors tend to zero, μ → 0, ε → 0. From Theorem
1 it follows that there are ﬁve “types” of the recurrent classes, if k ≥ 2. The idea
behind this section is based on the following observation. When mistake and error
rates are small, the process spends almost all time in the recurrent classes. There are
two possibilities to move from one recurrent class to another. Agents have to make
mistakes in their choices of the decision rules (this can happen with probability μ),
or make errors in choosing a strategy (this can happen with probability ε)i no r d e rt o
move from a recurrent class of one type to a recurrent class of another type. We are
interested in changes of the agents’ behavior or the movements between the recurrent
classes of diﬀerent types.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 19
Even though Theorem 1 identiﬁes the same recurrent classes in the case of two
decision rules and the imitation rule only, we have to take into account the best-
reply rule when we are looking for the long-run prediction of the model. The reason
is simple: a maximizer always demonstrates spiteful behavior. It means that if it
is easier to make a mistake in the selection of the decision rule than to make an
error in choosing a strategy to play, occasionally spiteful behavior will prevail and
consequently be the only possible behavior in the long run (if ε → 0f a s t e rt h a n
μ → 0). It means that only spiteful behavior will survive in the long run, because
such behavior is unaﬀected by the switching of the decision rules. However, if it is
easier to make an error in choosing a strategy to play than to make a mistake in the
selection of the decision rule (μ → 0f a s t e rt h a nε → 0), then altruistic behavior can
survive in groups, because the gain to stay in altruistic groups is higher than the gain
from staying in spiteful groups.
We are looking for the limiting distribution as the mistake, μ, and error, ε,p r o b a -
bilities tend to zero. We will assume that μ = μ(ε), μ(0) = 0 and analyze the limiting
distribution when ε → 0. The following main theorem describes completely long-run
outcomes for diﬀerent speed of convergence of μ and ε to zero.
Theorem 2. Suppose that k ≥ 2.
1. If limε→0
μ(ε)
ε < ∞ and N>4(k +1 ) ( k +2 ) , the limiting distribution of the
adjusted dynamic process ADN,k,μ,ε puts a positive probability on all recurrent classes
except for the absorbing states where all agents play strategy R.
2. If limε→0
μ(ε)
ε = ∞,o rN<4(k +1 ) ( k +2 ) , the limiting distribution of
the adjusted dynamic process ADN,k,μ,ε contains only the absorbing states where all
agents play strategy R.
3. If limε→0
μ(ε)
ε < ∞ and N =4 ( k +1 ) ( k +2 ) , the limiting distribution of
the adjusted dynamic process ADN,k,μ,ε puts a positive probability on all recurrentAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 20
classes.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof of the theorem shows that it is much easier to introduce altruistic behav-
ior in the spiteful world than vice verse, as long as the population size is suﬃciently
large and it is easier to make an error in choosing a strategy to play than to make a
mistake in the selection of the decision rule. The intuition for this result is as follows.
It takes only one mistake or error to introduce spiteful maximizer (imitator) into a
world of altruistic imitators. However, the resulting group of spiteful agents cannot
become more than 2k + 1. To get additional spiteful agents, additional mistakes
or/and errors are required. These mistakes or/and errors can lead to states where
there are many groups of spiteful agents. If two such groups join together after a
mistake or error, then the new group of spiteful agents will contain more than 2k+1
agents and this group will shrink in the next period in the presence of an altruistic
group of agents in the population. The only chance to create a spiteful world arises if
there are mistakes, or errors in every altruistic group of agents. The number of such
mistakes or errors is large for large N, because between every two spiteful groups of
agents there must be a group of altruistic agents.
Theorem 2 describes for what parameters N and k the long-run prediction of the
model contains altruistic behavior of agents. If μ = ε, or mistakes and errors are
equally likely, the main condition of the Theorem becomes a comparison between the
population size, N,a n d4 ( k +1 ) ( k +2 ) . I fw eﬁx k such that 2k +1=N, then the
unique prediction of the model is spiteful behavior of all agents. Now, if we keep ﬁxed
k and start to increase the number of agents on the circle, N,s p i t e f u lb e h a v i o r—a l l
agents play strategy S — will be the only long-run prediction until N =4 ( k+1)(k+2).
If we increase the number of agents, N, further, altruistic behavior appears. NoteAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 21
that altruistic behavior will appear if the number of agents on the circle is much
greater that the number of neighbors. Similar eﬀects arise if the number of agents on
the circle, N,i sﬁxed and we start to decrease the number of neighbors, k,d o w nt o
2.
One might expect that trembles in behavior are higher order than in selection
between behavior rules — people change behavior rules more consciously and delib-
erately than their actions. That would correspond to the case where μ goes to zero
faster than ε (μ → 0f a s t e rt h a nε → 0), the argument similar to the case μ = ε works
and a comparison between the population size, N,a n d4 ( k+1)(k+2) determines the
agents’ long-run behavior. This has an important bearing on the survival of “simple”
models of behavior in the face of competition from more sophisticated ones: Theorem
2 describes long-run outcomes, as if all agents would use only the imitation decision
rule. The comparison between the population size, N,a n d4 ( k+1)(k+2)deﬁnes the
agents’ long-run behavior. Theorem 2 generalizes the results of Eshel, Samuelson and
Shaked’s (1998) model for any population size, N, and any size of the neighborhoods,
k.
Theorem 2 also suggests how to provide public goods: the population should
be divided in (relatively) small neighborhoods in which everybody can observe the
nearest neighbors’ contributions. This can lead to altruistic behavior and to the
provision of the public goods.
5. Conclusion
This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which agents
can use two decision rules. This framework is modeled as a Markov chain on a ﬁnite
state space. It is shown (Theorem 1) that if k ≥ 2, short-run behavior of the system
can have ﬁve types: (i) all agents are altruistic, (ii) all agents are rational, (iii) there
are two types of agents so that between two clusters of altruistic agents there is aAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 22
cluster of two rational agents,( i v )t h e r ea r et w ot y p e so fa g e n t ss ot h a tbetween two
clusters of altruistic agents there is a cycle cluster when the number of rational agents
in the cluster varies from one to 2k + 1, then to three and then back to one, or (v)
diﬀerent combinations of (iii) and (iv).
This result is consistent with the results in Bergstrom and Stark (1993) and Eshel,
Samuelson, and Shaked (1998), where agents use only the imitation rule and have
four, k =2 ,o rs i x ,k =3 ,n e i g h b o r s . 9 One of the contributions of this paper is to show
that this result is robust to the introduction of the best-reply rule into the system.
Moreover, Theorem 1 is a generalization of the previous results for any population
size, N, and any size of the neighborhoods, k.
Theorem 1 also reveals that it is enough to have just one decision rule in order to
obtain the same short-run outcomes as we obtain in the case of two decision rules. It
means that we can use simple models with just one decision rule to analyze human
behavior: the short-run prediction is the same in more complicated models. There
are open and interesting questions for future research. Is it always the case that for
any set of decision rules, Ψ,a n dany game Γ there always exists a unique decision
rule ψ(ψ0) such that the short- (and long-) run predictions if the agents use the set
of decision rules Ψ,o rj u s to n ed e c i s i o nr u l eψ(ψ0) is the same for playing game Γ?10
I demonstrate that, even with the possibility of using the best-reply rule, altruistic
behavior can be sustained not only in the short run, but also in the long run. At the
same time, Theorem 2 shows the limit of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) results
9Bergstrom and Stark (1993) and Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) compare the average
payoﬀs instead of the highest payoﬀs. In their setting, the number of the neighbors can be two, or
four. These cases correspond to the cases k =2a n dk = 3 in my model.
10This paper describes the short- and long- run outcomes in the Public Good Game. It is the ﬁrst
step in our understand of the short- and long- run predictions in general games where agents can
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for an arbitrary number of neighbors. They ﬁx the number of the neighbors, four or
six, and ﬁnd the total number of agents, N, so that altruistic behavior survives in
the long run. Theorem 2 describes long-run outcomes for any number of neighbors,
k,a n df o ra n yt o t a ln u m b e ro fa g e n t s ,N.
My model also suggests how to provide public goods: the population should be
divided in (relatively) small neighborhoods where everybody can observe the nearest
neighbors’ contributions. This leads to altruistic behavior and to the provision of the
public goods.
6. Appendix
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :It is obvious that the states where all agents are playing
strategy R or all agents are imitators playing strategy A are absorbing.
To ﬁnd the remaining recurrent classes consider what happens to a cluster of
imitators playing strategy A. Note that any cluster of the imitators consisting of
1,2,...,k+ 1 agents will immediately disappear. So, imitators can play strategy A
in groups of the length k + 2 or more. Consider what happens to a cluster of agents
playing strategy R. Any cluster consisting of three or more agents will shrink in the
next period.11 It will be shrinking until the cluster of strategy R becomes of two
or one. The cluster of two agents playing strategy R will not change. However, if
there is only one agent playing strategy R among her 2k neighbors playing strategy
A, the whole neighborhood — all 2k+1 agents - will become maximizers and will play
strategy R in the next period. Then this cluster of maximizers consisting of 2k +1
agents playing strategy R shrinks to the cluster of maximizers consisting of three,
11It can stay the same size one more period if some agents use the imitation rule to select strategy
S in the current period. These imitators will switch their decision rule to the best-reply and will
play strategy S again in the next period. Imitators playing strategy P in the current period will
use the same rule in the next period and play strategy P.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 24
then one agent playing strategy R. This cycle will be repeated again. ¥
We now turn our attention to the perturbed adjusted dynamic process. In par-
ticular, we are interested in the limiting distribution of this process as the mistake,
μ, and error, ε, probabilities tend to zero. We assume that μ = μ(ε), μ(0) = 0 and
analyze the limiting distribution when ε → 0.
By arguments similar to those in Young (1993), the perturbed adjusted dynamic
process ADN,k,μ(ε),ε is a regular perturbation of ADN,k,0,0, and hence it has a unique
stationary distribution ρ(ε). Moreover, by Theorem 4 in Young (1993), limε→0 ρ(ε)=
ρ(0) exists, and ρ(0) is a stationary distribution of ADN,k,0,0.
Deﬁnition 1. (Young, 1993) A state h is stochastically stable if limε→0 ρh (ε) > 0.
Let the process ADN,k,μ(ε),ε have recurrent classes E1,...,EM. For each pair of
distinct recurrent classes, a pq-path is a sequence of states ζ =( hp,...,hq)b e g i n n i n g
in Ep and ending in Eq.T h eresistance of this path is the sum of the resistances on
the edges composing it. Let rpq be the least resistance over all pq-paths. Construct
a complete directed graph with M vertices, one for each recurrent class. The weight
on the directed edge Ep → Eq is rpq. A tree rooted at El is a set of M − 1 directed
edges so that from every vertex diﬀerent from El t h e r ei st h eo n l yp o s s i b l ed i r e c t e d
path in the tree to El. The resistance of such a rooted tree Ψ(El)i st h es u mo f
resistances rpq on its M − 1 edges. The stochastic potential of a recurrent class El
is the minimum resistance over all trees rooted at El. The following theorem is
analogous to results of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) on Wiener processes. Foster
and Young (1990) introduced the theorem to economics for continuous state spaces.
Young (1993, 1998) contains a discrete version of the theorem.
Theorem 3. (Young, 1998) The stochastically stable states are precisely the states
contained in the recurrent classes of ADN,k,0,0, having minimum stochastic potential.Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 25
Proof of Theorem 2: From Theorem 1 follows that any recurrent class can
contain N,N − 2,N− 3,N− 4,...,k+3 ,k+ 2, or 0 imitators playing strategy A.
Note that it is enough to make just one mistake, μ(ε), or one error, ε, for moving from
the recurrent class (iii) to the recurrent class (iv) from Theorem 1 and vice versa. It
means that these recurrent classes have the same stochastic potential. It also means
that the recurrent class (v) will have the same stochastic potential as recurrent classes
(iii) and (iv).
One error, ε, is enough for moving from the absorbing state {A;IM} (recurrent
class (ii)) to an absorbing state where N − 1 imitators are playing strategy A and
vice versa (recurrent class (iv)). At the same time, one mistake, μ(ε), is enough for
moving from the absorbing state {A;IM} to an absorbing state where N−1 imitators
are playing strategy A.
(k + 2) errors are required for moving from the absorbing state where all imi-
tators are playing strategy R (from recurrent class (i)) to the recurrent class where
only 2 agents are play strategy R for N even (to recurrent class (iii)), or to sets
of blinkers where 1,2k + 1, or 3 agents are playing strategy R (to recurrent class
(iv)). These (k + 2) errors must create a cluster of imitators consisting of k +2
agents playing strategy A. Note that all absorbing states in the set {(R;·)} (recur-
rent class (i)) have the same stochastic potential, because one mistake is enough for
moving from the absorbing states {R;BR} to {(R,...,R);(IM,BR,...,BR)},f r o m
{(R,...,R);(IM,IM,BR,...,BR)} to {(R,...,R);(IM,BR,...,BR)}, ..., fromAltruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 26



























What is the smallest number of mistakes and/or errors which is necessary to make
for moving from the recurrent class with at least (k+2) imitators playing strategy A
to the recurrent class where all agents are playing strategy R? Theorem 1 shows that
the cluster of imitators playing strategy A is at least of the length (k +2 )a n dt h e
cluster of strategy R is at most of the length (2k + 1) in any recurrent class. There
m u s tb ea tl e a s to n em i s t a k eo ro n ee r r o rp e rc l u s t e ro fs t r a t e g yA for moving to the
absorbing state where all agents are playing strategy R. After such a mistake or error
every cluster must consist of at most (k + 1) imitators playing strategy A in order
to disappear in the next period. It is possible for a cluster of the maximal length of
(2k+3). That cluster must be between two clusters of agents playing strategy R and
each of them consists of at most (2k + 1) agents. Hence, at least
N




min{ε,μ(ε)}Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game 27
mistakes and/or errors are necessary to move from the recurrent class (iii) or the
recurrent class (iv) into an absorbing state where all agents play strategy R,r e c u r r e n t
class (i). Figure 3 summarizes all the statements above. The statement of the theorem
follows immediately. ¥
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